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Militia or Regular Army?




1 During the period from the end of the war with Britain until the confirmation of the
Constitution  (1783-1787),  a  fierce  political  struggle  took  place  in  the  United  States
regarding the nature of the government in the new political entity that had just been
formed. Besides the discussion about the political, economic, juridical and social powers
of the government, there was also a discussion on the questions regarding the position,
nature and perception of the army.1 When the Americans began dealing with the nature
of the army in the post-revolutionary period, they already had a military past that was
rife with wars,  beginning with the early British colonies in North America and their
battles  with  native  American-Indians.  At  the  end  of  the  17th century  the  American
colonies  took  part  in  European  power  struggles,  mainly  those  between  Britain  and
France.2
2  While many argued for continuing the system of militias, which meant continuing the
responsibility of the states, there were those who argued that a central government also
needed to have a military force that would be based on a regular army, a navy, a system
of forts, arsenals, a military industry and a military academy for professional officers.3
The  most  outstanding  and  important  study  on  the debate  concerning  the  post-war
character  of  the  army  is  that  of  Richard  Kohn,4 who  deals  with  the  disagreements
between the federalists and the anti-federalists. But the book positions this debate within
the general  discussions about the power and authority of  the central  government in
relation to geo-strategic threats against the new republic. There is hardly any discussion
of the assumption that those who wanted a regular army had argued for this because of
their military experience in the revolution. The new military mechanism needed to be
adapted to American liberalism, giving serious consideration to the traditional fears of a
permanent standing army as a body that might injure the rights of the individual and
society. 
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3  This article presents an additional point rarely covered in detail elsewhere: The decision
to set up a regular army based on the eighteenth century European model (prior to the
French  Revolution)  also  came  from  the  experience  of  military  operations  in  the
revolution, especially in the southern colonies. 
4  In the historiography about the American Revolution there is a fascinating debate about
the  place  occupied  by  the  militia  in  winning  the  war.5 Therefore,  an  additional
contribution of this article is the attempt to correlate the historiographical debate (on
the degree of military efficiency of the militia and its contribution to winning the war)
with  the  perception  of  George  Washington  regarding  the  military  system  that  was
necessary for the United States during the course of the war. One should ask the question:
If the militia system was successful in the opinion of those who claim it had led to victory
in the revolution, why was there a desire to set up a regular army both during the war
and after it in a society that was apprehensive of this kind of army? Also, why was it
necessary to make such a far-reaching reform in the structure of the militia?
5  The article will deal mainly with George Washington, who was the central figure in the
attempt to set up a regular army during the revolution. The answers to the questions
raised  above  will  be  based  on  an  analysis  of  the  extensive  correspondence  that
Washington conducted with various personalities during the war, with an emphasis on
the period in which the fighting took place in the south, as seen through the instructions
and contacts that Washington had with the commander of the American forces in the
southern arena, General Nathanael Green.6 From the analysis of these letters it will be
possible to determine how Washington perceived the place and function of the militia
during the American Revolution and how this perspective influenced his desire to set up a
regular army.
II The Debate on the Army
6  Those in support of the establishment of a regular army in times of peace declared their
position in a series of manifestos published in the New York press between September
1787  and  August  1788.  In  The  Federalist,  No.  8,  there  is  an  insistent  call  for  the
establishment of a regular army. For Alexander Hamilton, its author, the presence of
regular armies in Europe averted the possibility of surprise conquest, rapid destruction,
and swift defeat. Although the colonialists valued their liberty, the absence of a regular
army would lead to liberty being exchanged for violent destruction of life and property.7 
7  These principles can also be found in the document that George Washington had written
in May 1783 at the request of Hamilton for the Congress. This was “Sentiments on a Peace
Establishment,”  and it  contained the recommendations  of  Washington for  the future
structure of an American military force.  Washington argued that the colonies should
maintain a standing army as the first line of defense in case of surprise attack by the
European powers.  He also asserted that  far-reaching reforms should be made in the
militia,  and that in case of emergency it would be placed under the command of the
regular army.8 The plans and proposals of Washington for the militia can be found in The
Federalist, No. 29, also written by Hamilton.9
8  Washington’s  document  may  be  defined  as  one  of  the  most  important  founding
documents of the American army. Although it was not accepted in full until the reforms
of Secretary of War Elihu Root in 1903,  many of its requirements,  especially the far-
reaching reform in the structure and operation of the militia, were introduced.10 
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9  The logic behind the federalists’ wish for a regular army in peacetime is clear, in spite of
the fact that the opposition to a regular army was one of the main reasons for protest by
the  colonialists  in  the  days  preceding  the  revolution.  The  reasons  for  the
apprehensiveness about a regular army can be found in the Anglo-Saxon tradition of the
colonies,  especially  in  the  radical  political  ideology  of  the  English  Whig  party  that
developed after the military dictatorship of Cromwell.11
10  The issue becomes sharper in view of the fact that the colonialists admired the Roman
Republic,  including its  military system.12 This  system is  based on the citizen who is
recruited during wartime and returns to his ordinary civilian life at the end of his period
of service.  Numerous comparisons were made in the colonies with the history of the
Roman Republic. For example, George Mason, one of the important revolutionaries in
Virginia, argued even before the outbreak of war with Britain that the colonialists should
continue to adhere to the republican tradition of choosing militia commanders. Mason’s
argument was that as long as the Romans preserved the republican nature of the army
they succeeded in conquering an empire and in maintaining their political and social
freedom. When this system was abandoned the Roman Republic fell.13
11 The comparisons with the Roman Republic continued during the period of the revolution
as well, when the senior commanders compared themselves to the esteemed figures of
that  republic.  Nathanael  Greene  was  Scipio  Africanus,  the  destroyer  of  Carthage;
Washington  resembled  the  young  Cato,  the  tribune  who  struggled  against  the
dictatorship of Julius Caesar. After the revolution it was said about Washington that he
gave up all  his  authority and military power exactly as Cincinnatus had done.14 The
colonialists  regarded  America  as  a  renewed  realization  of  the  Roman  Republic  and
warned against political, social and economic trends that would lead to its fall.
12  A paradox can therefore be found between the fears of a regular army and the desire to
establish one in peacetime, something that is illustrated further in the letters of George
Washington written during the years of the revolution. Washington often speaks in the
revolutionary  language  of  Thomas  Paine’s  Common  Sense or  the  Declaration  of
Independence, such as:  “We fight for Life, Liberty, Property”.15 Yet in military matters
there is a kind of reverence for the model that Washington saw as ideal – the regular
British army.16 This paradox is resolved by the fact that  the desire of Washington for a
regular army and his lack of trust in the militia system are due to his military experience
during the period of the revolution.
13  Two military models are at the heart of the debate. The first involved the militia as the
institution that represents the power of the citizen and his liberty. The second was the
standing army that represented the absolute power of the state over its citizens, to the
point of tyranny.17 But the course of the revolution itself added another dimension to the
debate. This is the practical military dimension that emerged from the conduct of the
revolution and the assertion of Washington and some of his generals that the only way to
overcome the British army was by establishing a similar military system – a regular army.
III. British Strategy during the War
14 The  military  history  of  the  American  Revolution  can  be  divided  roughly,  both
chronologically and regionally,  into two main stages.  The first period began with the
aborted American attack on British strongholds in Canada at the end of 1775, and ended
in October 1777 with the surrender of the British general Burgoyne at Saratoga.18 After
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this the war moved to the southern colonies until the capitulation of the British forces in
Yorktown in October 1781. 
15  The British regarded the American Revolution in the wider context of its colonial wars
during the eighteenth century.19 The political and military confrontation was perceived
as  the  revolt  of  British  citizens  against  the  Empire.  Moreover,  Britain  identified  the
American Revolution as a danger to its standing as a superpower,  especially vis-à-vis
France, Holland and Spain. In practical terms, the British plan of war was to take control
over the Hudson River and thus to detach the New England colonies from the rest, and
only later on to move southwards, and with the help of those settlers who had remained
loyal to the Crown (the ‘Loyalists’) to conquer the southern colonies. But the defeat at
Saratoga and the entry of France into the war at the beginning of 1778 led Britain to
change its strategy, depending increasingly on Crown supporters in the colonies.20
16  Washington understood, especially after the fall  of New York (August 1776),  that his
small  army was  not  capable  of  defending all  the  cities  in  America,  but  his  strategic
conclusion was that as long as a regular American army existed the revolution would also
continue to exist.21 Already at this stage of the war it could be seen that Washington
refused to regard the militia as a military force that could win the war, despite the fact
that a myth began to be formulated in the colonies that the irregular forces – the militia –
could face the British army. This perception developed after the battle of Breed’s Hill
(June 17, 1775), better known (mistakenly) as Bunker Hill. Many Americans regarded this
as a moral victory that strengthened the lessons learnt at Lexington and Concord, which
meant that the soldiers of  the militia who were motivated by revolutionary ideology
could  withstand  a  professional,  well-trained,  and  well-equipped  army.22 In  contrast
Washington claimed, even after the battle, that an army composed mainly of soldiers
serving only temporarily could not win the war. He also claimed that the militia were
merely an auxiliary force for a military system that must be based on a professional army
of soldiers disciplined and trained, which would be committed to serve throughout the
war.23
17  After the failure of the expedition to conquer Canada, Washington wrote to Congress that
it was not possible to depend on the militia or on any irregular military force that did not
function in the long term, and that it was necessary to build a standing army to achieve
the aims of the revolution. He added that the militia could not protect the colonies for
long,  and  therefore  the  establishment  of  a  regular  army  was  an  immediate  need.24
Washington also asserted in another letter that it was not possible to conduct a war or
plan future operations because of the instability of the militia.25 
18  Throughout  the  course  of  the  war  one  can find letters  to  various  people  in  which
Washington argues that it was necessary to set up a standing army.26 Thus it may be seen
that since the very beginning of the revolution Washington did not consider the militia to
be  a  dependable  military  force.  Several  years  before  Washington  had  himself  been
appointed as the militia officer of Virginia, but for him this appointment had merely been
a jumping board for a permanent position in the British army. For the British officer
corps the militia was no more than an auxiliary force, mainly for security assignments,
and not a military force for attack operations.27 During the course of  the revolution
Washington sent  the  militia  to  carry  out  defensive  tasks,  mainly  at  places  of  lesser
strategic importance or along the frontier facing the Indians (a lesser enemy than the
British army. 
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19  As long as Washington did not have a regular kind of army, he avoided a decisive battle
confrontation against the professional British forces.  Washington therefore adopted a
strategy of attrition and went into battle only when he knew that the chances of victory
were  clearly  in  his  favor.28 Washington  also  understood  that  the  British  army  was
dependent upon its navy for supplies and for transport from one place to another, and
therefore,  in order to neutralize this tactic,  Washington tried to lure the British into
conducting  battles  far  inland.29 The  attrition  strategy  of  Washington  had  two other
purposes. The first was an attempt to gain time in order to enlarge his forces, equip it,
and more importantly  to  train it.  The second was to induce the involvement  of  the
European powers, especially France, and perhaps also Spain and Holland, in support of
the colonies.
20  The defeat at Saratoga transferred the strategic focus of Britain to the colonies south of
the Potomac River. The British Minister of the Colonies, Lord Germain, estimated that
there were more loyalists in the south than in the north and therefore a smaller British
force would be required. The intention of Germain was to ‘Americanize’ the war, in so
doing to cause civil war among the American settlers: loyalists against patriots.  After
control was restored in the south, the British army could return and carry out military
operations in the northern colonies. The change in British strategy was also due to the
participation of France, Holland, and Spain in the war, which constituted an immediate
and more serious threat to the British Empire.30
21  At the end of 1778 the settled area of Georgia was conquered and this colony came back
under British control. The American-French attempts to regain it ended in painful defeat.
The British then went on to conquer South Carolina with the general aim of gradually
advancing northwards, establishing an operational base in the mouth of Chesapeake Bay
(Maryland),  and reconquering  the  northern colonies.  In  May 1780  Charleston (South
Carolina) was taken, and Washington tried to send his army, which was encamped around
the city of New York, southwards in an attempt to strengthen the militia forces. But the
situation of the Americans became worse after the defeat of General Gates at the battle of
Camden in August 1780. In fact, after this battle, there was no organized American army
in the south, and even the militias had ceased to function. It should be noted that during
this period there were various guerrilla groups operating in the south, but British control
over the settled areas of the colonies denied the guerrilla fighters freedom of movement
and support. However, the British failure to control the border areas of the southern
colonies allowed the guerrilla groups to re-organize and return to operational activities. 
22  In the autumn of 1780, Washington received another blow. Benedict Arnold, one of the
most  gifted  generals  of  the  revolution,  deserted  to  the  British  side.  Arnold  was  the
commander  of  the  system of  fortifications  at  West  Point,  and the  fear  was  that his
desertion  would  lead  to  the  fall  of  the  Hudson  River  into  British  hands.31 It  also
constituted a moral and psychological blow to American recruitment, since the desertion
of  such an esteemed commander indicated a lack of  confidence in the ability of  the
American army to win the war. These crises led Washington to focus once again upon the
situation  in  the  north.   He  therefore  issued  a  series  of  severe  orders  to  transfer
reinforcements to the fortification system at West Point and also to increase the state of
alert in Maryland and Virginia.32 From the series of letters that Washington sent to his
generals it appears that he intended to rely only on his regular forces and that he did not
count on the militia to provide the defense along the Hudson River. Although Britain did
not take advantage of the opportunity to control the Hudson River, the very presence of a
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large and well-trained British army supported by the navy in New York (the southern
egress of the Hudson River), can explain the fears and the measures taken by Washington.
33
IV. Military Developments in Europe (1648-1763)
23 In order to understand Washington’s military approach it is necessary to deal firstly with
two subjects.  The first  is  the change that  occurred in European armies  in  the years
following the Thirty Years War,  in particular the development of  standing armies in
France and Prussia in the years extending from the end of the Thirty Years War (1648) up
to the Seven Years War.34 The second subject is the type of military thinking at the end of
the eighteenth century prior to the French Revolution. These two processes intersected
in a  series  of  wars  conducted in  Europe,  beginning with the  wars  of  Louis  XIV and
reaching its peak in the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714), continuing through
the  War  of  the  Austrian Succession (1740-1748)  and ending  in  the  Seven Years  War
(1756-1763). The last two wars were marked by the remarkable victories of Frederick the
Great against the armies of France, Austria and Russia, and the Prussian Emperor was
considered as the most important military authority in the Western world at that time.35
The development of the Prussian army under the command of Frederick the Great is
therefore  crucial.  Moreover,  from the  end of  the  seventeenth century  the  American
colonies were involved in European conflicts, mainly between Britain and France.36 Thus,
the colonial settlers found themselves fighting side by side with British regular forces,
winning appointments as officers, and being exposed to the fighting methods of a regular
army. One of these officers was George Washington. This could explain the actions of
Washington during the American Revolution and his desire to establish standing army
acting in accordance with contemporary principles of military thinking, especially those
of the Prussian army.37 
24  During the course  of  the  Thirty  Years  War (1618-1648)  various  European countries,
including France, Holland and Sweden, began developing professional standing armies.
These armies were trained, equipped, and mobilized with the assistance of an efficient
taxation system, and were controlled by a centralized bureaucracy.38 The Thirty Years
War proved that one could not depend on unreliable mercenary armies. Regular soldiers
loyal to the crown could crush any internal opposition to central government, lay down
the law, and assist in the collection of taxes. The relatively long period of peace after
1648,  together  with  improvements  in  tax  collection  systems,  contributed  to  the
increasing size of armies. These trends created military forces that, in the French and
later the Prussian case, became effective instruments in the hands of those monarchs
aspiring to absolutism and European hegemony.39 
25  France came out of the Thirty Years War as the strongest military power, and Louis XIV
took  advantage  of  this  to  press  for  achieving  political  superiority  on  the  European
continent. 40 In order to conquer, fortify and hold the enormous territories extending
from the Low Countries (Netherlands) to the west, the Pyrenees to the south, and the
Rhine in the east, as well as to support dynastic claims (such as those in the Polish and
Spanish wars of succession), Louis XIV needed a large land army, especially infantry, that
was capable of protecting the border fortresses.41 We therefore find a gradual increase in
the size of the French army over the period of five decades during which Louis XIV ruled,
at the end of which the French army had about 390,000 soldiers.42 
26  The other kingdoms of Europe did not have the material, human resources or aspirations
of the France of Louis XIV, but they needed regular standing armies to withstand the
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French threat. By 1710 the Austrian army possessed 100,000 soldiers in a standing army,
making it the main component in the military coalition against Louis XIV. The ability of
the Austrians to cope with both French and Turkish aggression turned Austria into a
central power in Europe.43 England, in spite of its apprehensions regarding a regular
army, also increased its armed forces in this period, fighting with the Dutch army both in
the War of the Augsburg League and in the War of the Spanish Succession.44 Savoy and
other German states set up small standing armies that joined Austria in the wars against
the French and the Turks. Similar trends also occurred in Sweden and Russia.45 But the
most impressive development was that of the Principality of Brandenburg-Prussia.
27  The Prussian army also began to adopt the model of a professional army after the Thirty
Years War since it had not succeeded in defending its territories. The most significant
developments were made during the reign of the Prussian emperor Frederick William I
(1713-1740),  nicknamed “the  soldier  king”  (Der  Soldatenkönig).  Under  his  rule  Prussia
developed the fourth largest army in Europe and the strongest one on the continent.46
This  was  achieved  despite  the  limited  material  and  human  resources  of  Prussia  in
comparison with the other European powers.47  The Prussian army then achieved fame
during the reign of Frederick II ‘the Great’ (1740-1786). The Prussian rulers managed to
set  up  an  efficient  bureaucratic  system  and  invested  many  resources  despite
demographical and economic limitations. Walter Dorn asserts that: “… it was not Prussia
that made the army but the army that made modern Prussia”.48
28  The geo-strategic situation of Prussia was somewhat similar to that of the colonies in
North America. Prussia was strategically weak because it did not have natural borders
and  because  it  was  surrounded  by  European  powers  that  were  stronger  and  more
aggressive. Prussia also consisted of a group of territories without territorial contiguity.
The colonies in North America were surrounded by powerful enemies, with no natural
borders  either  in  the  north  or  the  south  that  could  bar  against  European  invasion,
whether British, French or Spanish.  Although there was physical contiguity of territory
among the colonies, each of them conducted its affairs independently with hardly any
coordination  with  neighboring  colonies,  and  military  cooperation  against  various
strategic threats was rarely to be found.
29 Frederick the Great held full military and political powers in his hands and his army was
based on an officer corps of Junker aristocrats. This was the poor but proud and tough
landed  aristocracy  considered  as  the  most  superior  and  consolidated  social  class  in
Europe, devoting its life to the service of country and emperor, unlike the French officer
corps that purchased rank with money,  and many of whom were not qualified to be
officers at all. Prussian soldiers were mostly native born recruits called up to join the
army, often by compulsion, on a territorial basis. Every district was divided into cantons,
each being obliged to provide a regiment.49 The stringent and rigorous training system
gave  the  Prussian  soldier  an  advantage  in  mobility  and  speed,  something  that  was
demonstrated in the wars conducted by Frederick the Great during the 1740s and 1750s.
30 The Prussian army under the command of Frederick the Great succeeded in winning two
important wars in Europe: the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years War.50
In both wars, the army confronted enemies that were stronger and bigger than itself.51
Should we wish to find the turning point in history at which the rise of the Prussian army
parallels a decline of the French army, this could be the battle of Rossbach (November 5,
1757),  when  Frederick  skillfully  combined  artillery  and  cavalry  to  defeat  a  French-
Austrian  force  twice  as  large.  Rossbach  demonstrated  the  military  philosophy  of
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Frederick  the  Great.52 He  understood  that  if  a  military  commander  wished  to  be
victorious in war he must conduct offensive battles. Thus the army of the enemy became
the main military target and not the supply lines or logistic stores.
31 There is no doubt that Washington did not want to build a centralized military system
like Prussia, and certainly not a system based on forced recruiting and a cruel system of
training and discipline that included physical punishment and executions for disciplinary
faults (even though there is evidence that his army did impose such punishments). But he
did aspire to build a national army acting in accordance with the principles of warfare
that were designed by Frederick the Great. Washington saw the essential need to oblige
the governors of the colonies to recruit soldiers and place them under the authority of
the Continental  Army  under  his  direct  command.  During  the  American  Revolution,
especially in the southern colonies, Washington sought the decisive battle that would end
the war. Already in September 1777 Washington wrote that: “One Bold Stroke will free
the land from rapine, devastations and burnings”.53
V. The Influence of European Art and Science on Washington
32 In order to understand the military perceptions of Washington, it is also necessary to
briefly  discuss  military  thinking  in   the  eighteenth  century  prior  to  the  French
Revolution. The theoretical and practical approach of Frederick the Great reflected the
ideas of the Enlightenment in showing that the arts of war should be taught like all the
other arts and that it demanded professional training and extensive knowledge in various
fields. The conclusion of Frederick the Great, as expressed in his Principes Généraux de la
Guerre, is that the arts of war can be based on a theoretical system of rules and principles
derived from the lessons of history.
33  Military success, in the period from the end of the Thirty Years War to the outbreak of
the  French  Revolution,  was  achieved  through  tactical  means  such  as  separating  the
enemy from his supply bases. Contemporary writers defined the importance of the link
between the army in the battlefield and its  bases of  supply,  something that  military
analyst Henry Lloyd referred to as the core principle.54
34  These lines of communication have important implications for the conduct of war. It is
necessary to select the shortest and most convenient line in order not to be exposed to
counterattack from the sides. If the line is too long the attacking army will be vulnerable
to losing supplies and reinforcements from counter-attacks. Therefore the attacker must
bring his supply bases forward and the defender must maneuver to threaten the lines of
communication and force the attacker to retreat.
35  This tactical approach was used in the operations conducted by the British as well as by
Washington’s Continental army.55 Although Washington was not a military analyst, there
is no doubt that he knew the military thinking of his period.56 Washington’s desire for a
standing army was shared by many of his staff officers.57 It is an interesting fact that the
senior officers of Washington who supported the establishment of a regular army were
those like Greene and Knox who had served earlier in the militias. On the other hand,
Charles Lee and Horatio Gates, who had served in the past as officers in the British army,
supported militia operations and were opposed to setting up a regular army. Some claim
that their opposition to the strategic perceptions of Washington led in the end to their
dismissal.58
36  Military thinking of the eighteenth century included an appreciation of the value of
irregular warfare and its place within the framework of regular warfare.59 It should also
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not be forgotten that the British army accumulated much experience in war against this
type of warfare during the colonial wars in North America, and that the first commanders
that George III appointed for war in the colonies were the veterans of the French and
Indian War.60 It may be that Washington was afraid that the British would succeed in
eventually overcoming the irregular forces in the south. It should also be remembered
that in spite of the fact the French army used such methods in the French and Indian
War, the war was finally decided in a series of regular battles, with victory for the British.
As Washington’s letters make clear, the way to obtain victory over the regular British
forces  (on  land  and on  sea)  would  be  with  the  help  of  a  regular  army trained  and
equipped for regular warfare.
37  Throughout the duration of the war Washington did not have sufficient soldiers or arms.
This was the reason why the American army was not capable, during most of the war, to
cope successfully with the British army in the orthodox warfare methods of the time.
These two basic facts led to a strategic paradox on the American side. In order for the
revolution to succeed and the colonies to achieve independence, it  was necessary for
Washington to defeat the British army. But the operational and logistic weakness of his
own  army  led  to  an  inability  to  initiate  a  wide-scale attack.   The  weakness  of  the
American army was demonstrated clearly in the battle of New York in the summer of
1776. After this battle Washington refrained from direct confrontation with the British
army on the battlefield. It may therefore be said that the failure in New York represented
a watershed in Washington’s strategic thinking.
VI. The Strategy of Washington
38 After the battle of New York, Washington had to deal with the fact that the war would not
end quickly in one decisive military action, although he never gave up his aspiration for
such a  battle.  Three  options  presented themselves.  The  first  option was  to  lead the
Continental army westward in order to avoid direct clashes and to use guerrilla tactics.
The second option was to conduct a series of clashes and tactical retreats with the aim of
causing losses to the British army without endangering his army in a regular battle. The
third option was to stand with all his army face to face with the British army and to risk
the outcome of a pitched battle.
39  Washington rejected the first option because it was based mainly on the fighting abilities
of the militia forces, something he did not trust. The second option was perceived by
Washington as  avoiding  the  challenge  posed by  the  British  army and as  a  cowardly
strategy that would eventually lead to the conquest of the central cities.  The third option
was the preferred one for Washington, but this required building up a regular army that
was well equipped and trained according to the European theories of warfare. Therefore,
until  his  army  was  ready  for  this  enormous  task,  Washington  designed  a  strategy
composed of the first two options, which were now merely tactical means to achieve his
strategic goal, the buying of time needed for building up a regular army. This was the
strategy based on attrition, or the “Fabian strategy”.61
40  The forays against Trenton and Princeton at the end of 1776 were evidence of the new
strategic line of action that Washington adopted, involving raids upon British strongholds
followed by retreat. Washington also designed this Fabian strategy in an attempt to put
political pressure upon Britain to abandon the war and the colonies.62  But Washington
never gave up the third option, and we know this from the series of letters he wrote
during the years 1779 and 1780. In these letters Washington claims that Britain would not
give up its empire in North America until it suffered another decisive defeat as it had in
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Saratoga. However, in his view, this defeat would take place only if his forces, together
with the French navy, could re-conquer New York. The decisive defeat eventually came at
Yorktown, justifying Washington’s overall  strategy (even if the location was somewhere
else).63
41  For  Washington,  the  most  important  principle  of  war  was  that  of  the  massing  or
concentration of forces. Frederick the Great wrote: “There is an ancient rule of war that
cannot be repeated often enough: hold your forces together, make no detachment, and
when you want to fight the enemy, reassemble all your forces and seize every advantage
to make sure of your success”.64 As long as the Continental army did not reach this goal
Washington refrained from a regular form of battle with the British army. The entry of
France would solve this problem. Washington’s traditional way of thinking is also evident
in the winter encampment of the American army in Valley Forge. During this time French
and Prussian officers arrived to train the army in European tactics. Military engineers
also  arrived  who  fortified  key  points  on  the  Hudson  River  (including  West  Point),
according to the method of the famous French engineer Vauban.65 
42  After this period of training, Washington felt that his army was prepared for war, and in
June 1778 the first regular battle between the Continental army and the British army took
place at Monmouth Court House, ending in victory for the Americans.66 This battle had
two implications.  The  first  was  that  it  was  the  last  battle  in  the  northern  colonies.
 Washington managed to station a line of defense around New York, enclosing the British
stronghold. The center of this line of defense was West Point. The commander of the
British forces in the north, General Clinton, did not try to break through this line of
defense,  which led to the transfer of the British war effort to the south.  The second
implication was the strengthening of Washington’s perception that the Continental army
was capable of confronting the regular British army.67 Therefore only a regular army
trained according to the European model could win the war.
43  With the war’s center of gravity transferred to the south and the successes of the British,
Washington’s descriptions about the disposition of the American military system became
gloomier, especially after the defeat of Gates at Camden in 1780. The main criticism of
Washington was the continued dependence on the militia system. Although the militia
forces had defeated the British army at the battle of Saratoga, Washington claimed that
the basic  assumption of  reliance on a  militia  force was erroneous.  This  was because
“regular troops alone are equal to the exigencies of modern war …the Militia will never
acquire the habits necessary to resist a regular force”.68 Washington argued that the
militia should be under the command of officers of the Continental army in order to
obtain  maximum  operational  effectiveness.69 This  point  was  emphasized  in  the
‘Sentiments’ document. 
44  In a letter that he wrote after the defeat of Gates, Washington tried to persuade the
recipient that his strategy of attrition was indeed working. He claimed that in spite of the
victories of Britain in the south, it was having difficulty financing the war and there were
signs of rebellion in Britain, especially by the Irish. Its international situation was also
difficult following the entry of France, Spain and Holland into the war. The conversion of
the American Revolution into a war in which the European powers were involved proved
the success of  the attrition strategy adopted by Washington.70  Britain was forced to
withdraw troops for the defense of Britain against French invasion and also to protect its
sugar plantations in the West Indies. In his view, Britain was close to the point at which
she could no longer continue to fight in North America. But Washington continues to
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assert that the establishment of a large standing army based on general recruitment for
three  years  was  essential  to  win  the  war.  The  United  States  would  never  win  its
independence so long as it did not have a regular army.71
45  Washington wrote to Congress that even though the British had not taken advantage of
their successes in the south to transfer the war back to the north, the defeat of Gates
demonstrated the  weakness  of  the  regular  army when it  depended upon the  militia
forces. In his opinion, the militia could never confront a regular army, and in order to
save the revolution it was necessary to recruit several thousand soldiers from the states
of North Carolina, Virginia, Maryland and Delaware, and to set up an army that would
also include cavalry and artillery units. The militia, within the framework of a regular
army, would constitute an auxiliary force that would be engaged in patrolling, securing
border crossings, and skirmishes.72 
VII. The Conduct of the War in the South by Greene
46 On October 14, 1780 Washington appointed General Nathanael Greene as commander of
the American forces  in the south,  and authorized him to determine the appropriate
strategy for rehabilitating the army and carrying out military operations against  the
British.73  In Washington’s opinion,  Greene was the man best suited to command the
southern  arena.74 His  appointment  stabilized  the  situation  in  the  south  and  led
eventually to the final surrender of the British at Yorktown. Greene’s non-conventional
thinking  is  often  praised,  yet his  thinking  was  not  unlike  that  of  Washington.  Both
generals  conducted a  strategy of  attrition,  but  executed it  in different  tactical  ways.
Greene always acted under the command of Washington and never tried to undermine his
authority  as  the  Supreme  Commander  of  the  American  forces.  Greene  was  the
commander of an arena, and in this capacity he had a fair amount of independence to
decide on strategy.
47  The first task for Greene was to reconstruct the military system: the regular, militia and
guerrilla forces in the southern colonies.  Even before Greene had reached the south,
patriot guerrilla units conducted an attack on a British-loyalist force at King Mountain
(October 7, 1780).75 This may be considered as a turning point in the south since it led the
British to set aside for the time being their planned advance northwards and to direct
their resources against the patriot guerrilla forces in South Carolina.76 
48  Greene claimed that the dismal situation of the regular army did not allow him to carry
out  offensive  operations  without  causing  further  catastrophe.77 He  therefore
relinquished  the  regular  method  of  warfare  and  engaged  in  irregular  warfare.
Washington  and  Greene  present  us  with  two  methods  for  conducting  war,  one
conventional  (Washington)  and  the  other  unorthodox  (Greene).  Greene  agreed  with
Washington’s strategy of attrition but carried it out in a different way, waging attrition
and buying time for the rehabilitation of the regular army. The army was then reinforced
by French forces preparing for the decisive battle of the revolution at Yorktown. Guerrilla
warfare was the means and the establishment of a regular army was the end. It is also
possible that the aim of the attrition strategy conducted by Greene was to damage the
financial abilities of Britain to continue with the war, and thus to induce Britain to end
the war through negotiations.
49  Greene’s unconventional approach also violated the principle of the concentration of
forces. He split his small army into three groups. One of these was under the command of
Daniel Morgan, whose task was to attack the British on the border between Georgia and
South Carolina.78 The second group was commanded by Henry Lee, who set up a mobile
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task force that linked up with the guerrilla group of Frances Marion along the shoreline
of South Carolina. The rest of the army under Greene’s command moved around in the
internal areas of the southern colonies in a Fabian-like strategy.
50  This approach even led the British to disperse their forces in response, which weakened
the British army and made it yet more vulnerable to guerrilla attacks. The commander of
the British forces in the south, General Cornwallis, split his army in order to keep track of
Greene  and  to  try  and  eliminate  Morgan’s  army.79 In  January  1781  Morgan’s  units
encountered the British units  at  Cowpens on the border  between the two Carolinas.
Morgan’s army was composed of regular soldiers and militiamen, but he did not depend
on the militiamen at all and estimated that they would flee from the battlefield when the
cavalry of Cornwallis arrived. Morgan told the militiamen to fire only three rounds of
ammunition and then to retreat. In fact, at the very beginning of the British attack the
militia units retreated.80 It may therefore be said that Morgan’s victory in this battle was
in fact the first victory in the south in which a regular American army confronted British
forces in conventional battlefield formation.81 What is more important is that the victory
infused  a  new fighting  spirit  in  the  southern  colonies  and  in  the  supporters  of  the
revolution. Greene’s split-force strategy led to a situation in which the two armies that
met at Cowpens each had an equal number of soldiers. When Greene arrived in the south,
the ratio between the American and British forces had been 1:10 in favor of the British.
51  Greene’s approach, based on the assumption that a series of defeats would eventually
lead to the total retreat of Britain from the colonies, combined a defensive strategy with
tactical offensive operations. The unconventional thinking of Greene found expression in
the splitting of his forces and the subordination of the guerrilla forces to his authority.82
Greene tempted the army of Cornwallis across the colonies of the south and distanced it
from its operational bases (in the southern cities), lengthening its lines of communication
and refraining from confronting the British in regular battle. Although this did not lead
to a significant victory between February and August 1781, the attrition of the British
caused them to abandon areas in Carolina and Georgia and to withdraw into the cities of
Savannah  (Georgia),  Charleston  (South  Carolina),  Wilmington  (North  Carolina)  and
Yorktown (Virginia).
52  The revolution ended with siege warfare according to the European model, involving the
integration of the French expeditionary force and navy. The last act of the revolution, the
conquest of the city of Yorktown, was a conventional one. Therefore, from the strategic
viewpoint,  there  was  no  difference  between  the  two  generals.   Greene  was
unconventional in his military thinking, but from his letters it appears that he believed
only a standing army, based on the eighteenth century European model, could win the
revolution. In a letter that he wrote to Washington, Greene says that the outcome of the
battle at King Mountain proved that one could depend on the irregular units for local
operations so that the British would be forced to direct military resources to the internal
areas of the southern colonies, thereby preventing their advance northwards towards
Virginia.83 Thus we find that there is a subordination of partisan warfare to his authority
for the sake of coordinating overall operations. As soon as Greene arrived in the south, he
wrote  to  Francis  Marion  and Thomas  Sumter  that  he  was  aware  of  their  important
operations that denied the British any achievements after the defeat of Gates at Camden,
but that their main task at present was to gather intelligence about the strength and
intentions of the British.84 
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53  Greene’s perception that only a regular army could confront the British and win the war,
in line with Washington’s thinking,, can be found in a series of letters that he wrote to
various governors of the colonies. Greene wrote that although the fighting spirit of the
militia was high, it  should constitute an auxiliary force and that the main war effort
should be carried out by the regular army.85 In a letter to the North Carolina Board of
War, Greene writes that the war in the south would continue to be a partisan war “… until
we have a more permanent force to appear before the enemy …”.86 Two conclusions may
be deduced from this letter.  The first is proof that Green used the irregular units to
rehabilitate the army. The second,  which is  derived from the first,  is  once again the
inability of the irregular units to win the war. Greene was fully aware of the fact that the
governors  of  the  colonies  had  reservations  against  any  threat  to  their  authority,
especially their control over the militia forces.87 
54  But in the letters to his colleagues in Washington’s headquarters one can find his real
opinion  about  the  militia.  No  control  over  the  militia  was  possible  because  the
commanders  obeyed  the  authority  of  the  governor  and  not  the  authority  of  the
Continental Congress (in effect, that of Washington), and they could not be subordinated
to any political or military authority higher than the level of the colony. Moreover, the
officers were not suited to their positions of command and   “… everybody is a General …”
as Greene complained to Knox.88
55  So, in spite of the continued partisan activity in the south, Greene never expected that
the war would be won by irregular units. In a letter that was sent to Greene after the
victory at Cowpens, Washington claims that the victory of Morgan was achieved through
his  adherence  to  the  traditional  principles  of  warfare.89 In  a  letter  to  Congress,
Washington announced that the victory of Morgan would enable Greene to continue his
rehabilitation of the regular army.90
56  From the letters that Washington wrote to Greene after Cowpens, we find once again the
desire  of  Washington  to  conduct  a  war  based  on  the  guiding  principle  of  the
concentration of forces. Washington instructs Greene to refrain from large operations
against the British since his forces were still small and dependent on militia forces.91
Washington’s views of the militia were also shared by French officers.92 
VIII. Conclusion
57 As this article has tried to show, based on the letters of Washington and Greene, neither
of them relied on irregular forces as the main fighting force of the revolution and instead
aspired, during the entire course of the war, to set up a permanent army. The strategy of
these two men was that of a war of attrition. Washington sent the militias on hit-and-run
operations  and  to  collect  intelligence,  and  at  the  same  time  to  build  a  system  of
fortifications on the Hudson River based on European models introduced by Vauban,
relying on European officers to train the regular army in European methods of warfare.
His intentions were to induce the British to focus on militia operations and thus to buy
extra time for the regular army to rehabilitate and train. Military literature prior to the
French  Revolution  also  did  not  provide  an  independent  function  for  irregular  units
except within the framework of close cooperation with the regular armed forces, and this
is  exactly what Washington and Greene did.  Thus the military thinking of  these two
generals was in accordance with the conventional European thinking of the eighteenth
century. 
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58  The greatness of Washington was in his creation of a strategy that suited the military
realities he confronted, while the greatness of Greene was in finding a balance between
conventional  warfare  (European)  and  unconventional  warfare  (American).  From  the
strategic viewpoint, both generals shared the same perceptions, which were that only a
regular army, organized and trained in the modern methods of warfare, was capable of
winning  the  war.  This  strategic  thinking  greatly  influenced  those  who,  after  the
revolution, supported the establishment of a regular army in peacetime. The clearest
expression  of  this  thinking  can  be  found  in  the  ‘Sentiments’  document  in  which
Washington asserted that it was necessary to set up a regular army, and that in times of
emergency the militias must be subordinated to a central political authority.
59  Greene rehabilitated his army while continuing to conduct irregular warfare against the
British in order to prevent them from establishing themselves in the south. If 1780 was
the most difficult year of the revolution, and if we accept the claim that the activities of
Greene saved the revolution in the south, and thus the revolution as a whole, it may be
claimed that the appointment of Greene, and even more so, the liberty given to him to
conduct the fighting with hardly any interference by Washington,  were probably the
most  important  and  decisive  decisions  that  Washington  made  during  the  war.
Paradoxically, it was only after they had adopted the very institutions for which they
went to war against the British Empire that the Americans were able to achieve victory in
war to gain their independence. 
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